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I. INTRODUCTION
Money market funds ("MMFs") were first developed in the 1970s, and
since that time, they have become increasingly popular as an alternative to
deposit accounts. Since the financial crisis of September 2008, there has
been much discussion about the systemic risks posed by alternatives to
commercial banking products. One of the key themes of this discussion is
whether the systemic importance of these alternative banking products
justifies the imposition of heightened regulation and supervision. This
article takes the view, after a comparison of deposit accounts and MMFs,
that MMFs are systemically important. It then goes on to consider, through
the lens of systemic risk analysis, the reforms to MMF regulation that have
been proposed since September 2008.

* Hilary J. Allen, LLM (Securities & Financial Regulation), Georgetown
University Law Center, 2010; LLB (First Class Honors), University of Sydney, 2003; BA,
University of Sydney, 2001. Admitted to practice in New York and New South Wales,
Australia.
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE PRODUCTS

A. Deposit Accounts
Commercial banks play an important role in our society: they function
as a place to keep money, provide credit and can be used as an instrument of
monetary policy. Because of these characteristics, legislators, regulators
and economists treat banks as "special." 1 Commercial banks are authorized
by law2 to receive deposits from customers - they pay interest on the
deposited funds to the depositors and lend the deposited funds to other
customers at a higher interest rate. There is a fundamental instability in this
classic bank business model, however, which is caused by the maturity
mismatch between the funds on deposit (which can be withdrawn at will)
and the loans, which are made on a longer-term basis and cannot be called
in at will? This inherent fragility of the bank business model and the
"specialness" of banks provide the justification for increased regulatory
scrutiny of banks, which involves ongoing supervision from the relevant
regulator (especially with respect to the maintenance of regulatory capital)
4
to ensure that the institution is "safe and sound.
Banks only have a fraction of the cash deposited with them on hand at
any one time, which means that they would become insolvent if all
depositors were to seek to get their money back at once.' This is what
happens in a classic bank run: once depositors in a bank see other depositors
withdrawing funds from that bank, they make a "prisoner's dilemma"-type
calculation and conclude that they need to withdraw their funds before all

1. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special? TH-E REGIoN (1982), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ ar1982a.cfm.
2. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2009). This provision of the US Code confers the power to
accept deposits to nationally chartered banks with state chartered banks having equivalent
powers.
3. Corrigan, supra note 1.
4. Banks and Banking Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 21-522 (2010). Commercial banks are
currently regulated by a patchwork quilt of regulators. They may be subject to the
supervision of state regulators, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and/or the Office of Thrift
Supervision, depending on whether they are chartered at a state or national level, and
whether they are a member of the Federal Reserve or not. Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1820(d)
(2010), each FDIC-insured institution must undergo an on-site examination by the relevant
regulator every year (or every 18 months for smaller, healthy banks). Each of the regulators
uses the "CAMELS" rating system to evaluate a bank's safety and soundness. The
CAMELS system requires the relevant regulator to provide a bank with a rating from 1 to 5
(with 1 being the highest and 5 being the lowest) for each of Capital Adequacy,
Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market risk. The bank also receives a
composite rating (also from 1 to 5) for its safety and soundness.
5. Corrigan, supra note 1.
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the funds on hand have been withdrawn by others.6 This type of panic is
contagious and can jump from banking institution to banking institution.
This happened recurrently in America in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.7 To avoid these types of runs, it is essential to maintain
the confidence of depositors in their banks' ability to repay their deposits.
In furtherance of this aim, the Banking Act of 1933 created the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (the "FDIC"), to which banks can apply8 to
become an insured depositary institution.
If an insured depositary
institution fails, a depositor can recover 100 cents on each dollar deposited
in that bank, up to a maximum amount of $250,000 per category of legal
ownership. 0 Despite the fact that, at the time the FDIC was created, it
lacked any support from the President, bankers, or economists (the latter of
whom opposed deposit insurance as a moral hazard),11 there have been no
widespread runs on traditional commercial banks since 1933. This absence
of runs has been attributed to the presence of deposit insurance 12 - the theory
being that if a depositor understands that his or her funds are protected by a
government guarantee, he or she is much less likely to rush to withdraw his
or her funds in the event that a bank, or indeed the entire banking industry,
is faltering.
B. Money Market Funds
A MMF is a type of open-end investment company, regulated by the
13
SEC pursuant to the Investment Company Act of 1940 and Rule 2a-7
made pursuant thereto. MMFs have grown in popularity since they were
first introduced in the 1970s, and now, according to the Investment
Company Institute (the "ICI"), 14 MMIFs currently have $2.806 trillion under

2

6.

GARY GORTON, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT THE FINANCIAL CRISIS

7.

Id.There were bank panics in the United States in 1837, 1857, 1873, 1907 and

(2010).
1929.
8. 12 U.S.C. § 1815 (2010).
9. GORTON, supra note 6. This ceiling was increased from $100,000 to $250,000
during the recent financial crisis, indicating the perceived importance of deposit insurance in
maintaining confidence in the traditional banking system.
10. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(a). Categories of legal ownership include single accounts, joint
accounts, trust accounts, and corporate accounts.
11. GORTON, supra note 6.
12. Id.Though it is impossible to prove empirically that the absence of runs since
1933 has been caused by the implementation of deposit insurance, the prevalence of bank
runs prior to 1933 and the absence of commercial bank runs thereafter suggests that deposit
insurance has been at least an important factor in quelling the panics that precipitate such
runs.
13. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010).
14. The industry association representing money market funds and other mutual
funds.

Journalof Business & Securities Law

[Vol. I11

management.15 Although MMFs were developed in the 1970s as a way for
retail investors to capitalize on high yields on Treasury bills, these yields
have since shrunk and now it is the convenience of MMFs that makes them
popular with investors (both retail and institutional). MMFs are usually
offered by fund families as one of a range of investment products, as
investments in a MMF can be moved easily to and from other investments
(to the extent funds are not invested in other investments, they can remain in
the MMF and earn interest). Justice Pollack has emphasized that "the
flexibility available to an investor to swing from one form of investment to
another, simply, efficiently .

.

. is of considerable advantage to the Fund

shareholder."16
For institutional investors, MMFs provide a cash
management tool that provides the investor with extra diversification and
liquidity, while avoiding some of the personnel and settlement expenses the
institutional investor would incur if it managed its own cash. 7
When a customer invests in a MMF, that customer is buying a share in
a mutual fund that typically invests in "short-term money market securities
expected to pay the highest current income consistent with preservation of
capital and maintenance of liquidity."' 8 Any income earned by the MMF is
credited to a customer account in the form of dividend shares, which are
declared daily. As MMFs are registered open-end mutual funds, shares in
MMFs can be redeemed at any time19 (which emulates the withdrawal-atwill feature of deposit accounts). Since the late 1970s, MMFs have tended
to keep their net asset values ("NAVs") stable at $1 to satisfy customer
appetites for an investment with a constant share value.2
MMFs are the only mutual funds that are entitled to maintain a stable
21
NAV, and this is done pursuant to Rule 2a-7(c) through the use of the
amortized cost valuation method, which allows the assets of a fund to be
15. Money Market Mutual FundAssets, INv. Co. INST., http://www.ici.org/research/
stats/mmfmm 06 24 10 (last visited June 23, 2010).
16. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 528 F. Supp. 1038, 1050 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
17. See Andrew B. Lyon, Money Market Funds and Shareholder Dilution, 39(4) J.
FIN. 1011, 1012 (1984); see Stevens, infra note 35. Deposit accounts may not be a viable
alternative for institutional investors, given that banks may not want such large at-will
deposits on their books. In any event, deposit account insurance is not attractive to
institutional investors because the large amounts that such investors have to invest would
exceed the $250,000 cap.
18. Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., 694 F.2d 923, 925 (2d Cir. 1982).
19. Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, § 22(e). However, a
MMF can suspend the right of redemption for up to seven days.
20. MATTHEW P. FINK, THE RISE OF MUTUAL FuNDs: AN INSIDER'S ViEw 83-84
(2008).
21. See Lyon, supra note 17, at 1011 (noting the arbitrage opportunities inherent in
having a stable NAV for a share that differs from the market value of that share - arbitrageurs
"could increase their holdings of the MMF when it was undervalued and sell their shares
when the MMF was overvalued").
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valued at their amortized cost value,22 rather than at their market value (the
SEC permits this type of valuation on the assumption that "high quality,
short-term debt securities held until maturity will eventually return to their
amortized cost value, regardless of any current disparity between the
amortized cost value and market value, and would not ordinarily be
expected to fluctuate significantly in value"). 23
The requirements of Rule 2a-7 were supplemented by changes that
came into effect on May 5, 2010 (which will be discussed below). As in
force prior to May 5, 2010, Rule 2a-7(c) provided that a mutual fund could
not use the amortized cost method, and Rule 2a-7(b) provided that a mutual
fund could not hold itself out as a MMF, unless its portfolio met the
standards for portfolio maturity, quality and diversification specified in Rule
2a-7(c)(2)-(4) (as then in force). The restrictions on portfolio maturity set
out in Rule 2a-7(c)(2) required that a MMF not invest in an instrument with
maturity greater than 397 days2 4 and that the dollar-weighted average

maturity for the whole portfolio not exceed 90 days. The restrictions on
portfolio quality were set out in Rule 2a-7(c)(3): a MMF could only invest
in rated securities if the MMF's board had determined that the securities
posed minimal investment risks and if the securities were in the credit rating
agency's top two short-term rating categories (if the securities were unrated,
to be eligible investments they had to be comparable to securities in those
top two short-term rating categories). 5 Securities that were (or were
equivalent to securities that were) in a credit rating agency's second top
short-term rating category ("second tier securities") could not comprise
more than 5% of a MMF's portfolio.
Finally, the diversification
requirements set out in Rule 2a-7(c)(4) prevented a MMF from investing
more than 5% of its assets in securities issued by a single issuer (there are
no concentration limits on holdings of government securities, like Treasury
bills). 6 In addition, a MMF could not invest more than the greater of 1% of
its assets and $1 million in second tier securities issued by a single issuer.
These restrictions were intended to reduce the risk of volatility in the NAV
of a MMF share, by ensuring that the MMF held high-quality, short-term
assets, and was not overly exposed to any one issuer.

22.

Meaning that the portfolio of securities held by the fund is assumed to increase

in value until maturity, and thus is valued using the cost of those securities at the time they

were acquired by the fund, as adjusted for amortization of premium or accretion of discount.
When calculating the NAV of a share, the securities are not marked to market.
23. Money Market Fund Reform, Investment Company Act Release No. 29132
(Feb. 23, 2010).

24. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010). This requirement remains in force in the amended
Rule 2a-7.
25. Id. This component of Rule 2a-7(c)(3) remains in force.
26. Id. This diversification requirement also remains in force.
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In addition to these portfolio quality, maturity, and diversification
requirements, Rule 2a-7(c)(7)(ii) 27 provided that a MMF could only rely on
the amortized cost valuation method if the fund's board tracked the actual
market value of its assets (this process is known as "shadow pricing"). If the
difference between the market value of a share in the MMF and the value of
a share in the MMF valued using the amortized cost method is more than
$0.005, then the board of that MMF must decide whether the shares need to
be repriced. If shares are repriced below $1, then a fund is said to have
"broken the buck."
C. Comparison of the Products
Deposit accounts and MMFs are both seen by the investing public as
products where cash can be kept safely, earn a steady return and be
withdrawn at will. Despite that fact that an investment in a MMIF is actually
an investment in securities, a SEC Commissioner has acknowledged that
"investors generally treat money market funds as cash investments. '28 The
Second Circuit has also recognized that "the purchaser's investment in the
Fund is more like a bank account than the traditional investment in
securities. 2 9 However, despite the superficial similarities, the underlying
structures of these products are very different and this has led to different
regulatory treatment of these products.
As discussed above, because the liabilities of commercial banks are
not easily liquidated, banking regulators supervise commercial banks on an
ongoing basis to promote their safety and soundness in order to avoid runs
(these commercial banks are also eligible to apply to the FDIC for insurance
with respect to deposit accounts).
Because funds (like MMFs)
predominantly invest in securities rather than the comparatively illiquid loan
assets held by commercial banks, funds have traditionally been viewed as
being less likely to be subject to a run than commercial banks.30 However,
runs on funds are still possible, as described succinctly by Brunnermeier:
Equity-holders who withdraw their capital receive a share of the ... fund's net
asset value. In this case, an early-mover advantage arises to the extent that fund
managers sell liquid assets first. To see this point, consider a fund that holds $50
million in highly liquid cash and $50 million in hard-to-sell illiquid securities
27.

Id. This provision of the rule was not changed by the amendments that became

effective in May 2010, but was renumbered as Rule 2a-7(c)(8)(ii).
28. Luis Aguilar, Comm'r, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Investment Company Institute
and Federal Bar Association Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference (Mar.
15, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch0315l0laa.htm)
(quoting Revisions to Rules Regulating Money Market Funds, 61 Fed. Reg. 13,955, 13,957
(Mar. 28, 1996)).
29. Gartenberg, 694 F.2d at 925.
30. KERN ALEXANDER, RAHUL DHUMALE & JOHN EATWELL, GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
OF FiNANcIAL SYSTEMS: THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF SYSTEMIC RISK 56 (2006).
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that at short notice can be sold for only $30 million. If the fund services early
withdrawals using its cash cushion, then early withdrawers receive their full
share of the mark-to-market net asset value of $100 million. But once the fund
has to sell the illiquid assets under pressure to pay out the remaining investors,
net asset value declines and late withdrawers receive only a percentage share of
the sale price of the remaining assets, which is $30 million, not $50 million. In
sum, a first-mover advantage can make financial institutions in general, not only
banks, subject to runs.31

Instead of supervising MMFs on an ongoing basis, 32 the SEC seeks to
limit runs through the prophylactic Rule 2a-7, which protects investors in
MMFs by reducing the amount of hard-to-sell illiquid securities held by the
fund. However, Rule 2a-7 does not address the possibility that market-wide
panic can stymie the liquidity of MMF portfolios, leaving MMFs in a
situation analogous to that of a commercial bank that cannot liquidate its
assets.
Looking beyond regulation to function, deposit accounts and MMFs
both play a key role in the economy. As discussed above, commercial

banks are "special" because they take in deposits, provide credit, and can be
used as an instrument of monetary policy. 33 Until the financial crisis of
2007-2008, regulators did not focus on the reality that financial products

outside the highly-regulated commercial banking sphere (like MMFs) were
also "special," in that they provided both a place to keep money and a vital
source of credit to the economy.34 Many corporations raise short term
funding through the issuance of unsecured commercial paper, and the ICI
estimates that MMFs hold nearly half of all commercial paper issued in the
United States.35 The primary source of funding for many local governments
is the issuance of municipal bonds, and the ICI estimates that MMFs hold
nearly two-thirds of all municipal bonds issued in the United States.36

MMFs are the dominant players in the highly concentrated tri-party
repurchase market,37 in which they purchase highly rated securities from
institutions (often, prior to the financial crisis, investment banks) through a
clearing house (either JPMorgan Chase or The Bank of New York Mellon)
31. MARKus K. BRUNNERMEIER, FINANCIAL CRIsIs REPORT FOR FINANCIAL CRIsIs
INQUIRY COMMIssION (2010), available at http://www.fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0227Brunnermeier.pdf.
32. The SEC's supervisory mandate is limited to periodic examinations of MMFs to
ensure compliance with its rules.
33. Corrigan, supra note 1.
34.
GORTON, supra note 6.
35. Paul Schott Stevens, President, Inv. Co. Inst., Weathering the Worst: Making
Money Market Funds Even Stronger (Mar. 15, 2010) (transcript available at
http://www.ici.org/policy/current issues/l 0 mfim conf ss spch).
36. Id.
37. GARY GORTON & ANDREW METRICK, NAT'L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
REGULATING THE SHADOw BANKING SYSTEM 13 (2010), available at http://papers.ssr.com/
sol3/papers.cfmabstract id=1676947. It is estimated that, in December 2008, MMFs held
$552 billion of repo.
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with a promise to resell those securities to the original seller at the end of
the term of the agreement (usually overnight).38 During the financial crisis
when MMFs were facing mass redemptions, MMFs stopped purchasing
these securities and thus funding for all of the aforementioned issuers and
holders of securities dried up. The experience of 2008 shows how integral
MMFs are to the flow of credit in the United States. Obviously, given that
MMFs hold nearly $3 trillion in assets under management, they are a sizable
holder of funds. In light of these factors, this article takes the position that
MMFs are just as "special" as commercial banks and thus warrant special
regulatory attention.
D. The Reserve Primary Fund
Prior to September 2008, only one money market fund had ever
broken the buck,39 and MMFs were seen to be (and marketed as) a very safe
and stable investment. Indeed, once the economy started to sour in the
summer of 2007, there was an increased rate of investment in MMFs as they
were seen to be one of the safest places for money. The Reserve Primary
Fund was a large MWF that had approximately $62.5 billion in assets under
management in September 2008, of which $785 million was invested in
debt securities issued by Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., ("LBHI"). Following
LBHI's announcement on September 14, 2008, that it would file for
bankruptcy the next day, there was a run on the Reserve Primary Fund with
institutional investors redeeming approximately $40 billion of shares in two
days (many of these redemptions were in the nature of arbitrage because the
shares, dependent as they were on the value of LBHI securities, were
overvalued at $1). On September 16, 2008, the board of the Reserve
Primary Fund determined that its holdings of LBHI securities were
essentially worthless (these made up a larger portion of the Reserve Primary
Fund than they had two days earlier, because many of the Fund's better
assets had been sold to meet the redemption requests of the arbitrageurs)
and the NAV of shares in the Reserve Primary Fund fell to 97 cents,
breaking the buck. The board of the fund suspended redemptions for one
week to limit the run on the fund's assets and voted on September 29, 2008
to liquidate the fund.40
38. FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., TRI-PARTY REPO INFRASTRUCTURE REFORM 6
(2010). The Federal Reserve Bank of New York has estimated that during the first quarter of
2010, "the value of securities financed by tri-party repos averaged 1.7 trillion." While that
number is huge and shows the systemic importance of tri-party repos, it is a significant drop
from the estimated average of $2.8 trillion in early 2008.
39. See FINK, supra note 20, at 179. This was in 1994, when Community Bankers
U.S. Government Money Market Fund, a small money market fund with only institutional
investors, had its NAV fall to 96 cents.
40. SEC v. Reserve Mgmt. Co. (In re the Reserve Fund Sec. & Derivative Litig.),
2010 WL 685013 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2010).
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When the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck on September 16,
2008, it was a signal to the world that MMFs were not as stable an
investment choice as everyone had previously thought. This caused panic
in the financial markets. There was a fear that MMFs generally would not
be able to pay all redemptions at $1 per share. Thus, MMFs generally faced
an increased level of redemptions from institutional investors - 14% of the
assets held by taxable prime MMFs were withdrawn during the week of
September 15, 2008.41 Notwithstanding this, the funds were able to honor
redemptions and the anticipated collapses of the funds did not materialize;
however, it is not clear to what extent this was because fund advisers, or
related companies, provided capital support to the MMFs to ensure that they
did not break the buck 42 and to what extent redemption requests were
curtailed by an increase in investor confidence resulting from the
government intervention discussed below. In any event, MMFs did have to
start liquidating some of their assets in order to satisfy increased redemption

requests.
Selling was difficult because the liquidity of the assets held by MMFs
had been compromised by the general market failure, and the volume in
which securities were being sold drove down the price of those assets
generally, affecting the financial system as a whole. Federal Reserve
Chairman Bernanke explained the ripple effects of the Reserve Primary
Fund breaking the buck as follows:
[It] triggered extensive withdrawals from a number of money market funds. Those
funds responded to the surge in redemptions by attempting to reduce their holdings
of commercial paper and large certificates of deposit issued by banks. Some firms
that could not roll over maturing commercial paper drew on back-up lines of credit
with banks just as the banks were finding it even more difficult to raise cash in the
money markets.43

When MMFs reduced their holdings of commercial paper and limited
their involvement in the tri-party repurchase market, that caused those
markets to dry up and institutions that relied on commercial paper and
repurchase agreements for short-term funding needs were left without a way
of raising funds. Thus, the failure of LBHI precipitated several separate but
interconnected runs: the first was the run on the Reserve Primary Fund by
41. INV. CO. INST., REPORT OF THE MONEY MARKET WORKING GROUP 62 (2009),
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr 09 mmwg.pdf.
42. See Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, § 17a-9, 54 Stat. 789.
Interestingly, in the absence of exemptive relief (which was readily granted by the SEC in
2008), the provision of support by a fund adviser or related company to a MMF would have
been an affiliate transaction prohibited by Section 17(a) of the Investment Company Act of
1940. The SEC has addressed this going forward by relaxing Rule 17a-9 under the
Investment Company Act of 1940 to allow for the provision of such support.
43. Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., Current
Economic and Financial Conditions (Oct. 7, 2008) (transcript available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/ newsevents/speech/bernanke2008lOO7a.htm).
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investors in that fund because of its exposure to LBHI (this article shall
refer to this type of run as a "single-fund run"). This run led to the Reserve
Primary Fund breaking the buck, which caused a panic that led to a run on
MMFs generally (this article shall refer to this type of run as an "industrywide run"). The run on MMFs caused MMFs to reduce their holdings of
commercial paper and participation in the tri-party repurchase market,
effectively causing a run on those markets (this article shall refer to this type
of run as a "systemic run").
1. Regulatory Reform ofMoney Market Funds
a. Rule 2a-7
In response to the 2008 financial crisis and the Reserve Primary Fund
breaking the buck, the SEC recently revised Rule 2a-7. The key changes,
which became effective in May 2010, include the imposition of new
liquidity requirements under Rule 2a-7(c)(5), which will require that 10% of
the MMF's assets mature on any given day and 30% of the MMF's assets
mature within a week.44 Funds also must adopt "know your investor"
procedures to help them anticipate the potential for heavy redemptions and
adjust their liquidity accordingly. In addition, the limit on the dollarweighted average maturity of the portfolio will be reduced from 90 to 60
days.45 There are more stringent requirements with regard to second tier
securities, in that Rule 2a-7(c)(3) was tightened so that no more than 3% of
a MMF's investments can be in second tier securities4 6 and a MMF cannot
hold second tier securities with a maturity of greater than 45 days. Rule 2a7(d)(i)(C) was tightened so that second tier securities from a single issuer
cannot comprise more than 0.5% of a MMF's portfolio. New stress testing,
reporting and disclosure obligations have also been included in Rule 2a-7.
In addition to the revisions to Rule 2a-7, the SEC has also revised Rule 22e3 to permit a MMF that has broken the buck to suspend redemptions, so that

44. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7 (2010).
45. Id.
46. Id. The SEC has tried to avoid undue reliance on the credit rating agencies in
their amendments to Rule 2a-7 by requiring MMF boards to designate four rating agencies
that will be used in determining the eligibility of an investment by the MMF, and by
requiring the boards to review the use of the selected rating agencies on an annual basis. By
making such changes, the SEC is trying to make it clear that the credit rating agencies do not
have the SEC's imprimatur, but realistically the change does little to reduce reliance on the
rating agencies as a method of evaluating investments. The recent financial crisis has to
some extent discredited ratings from Standard & Poors, Moody's, and Fitch, but there is no
substitute available for these ratings. The question of what to substitute for these ratings and
how to reduce reliance on the credit rating agencies is a difficult issue that is beyond the
scope of this article.
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the MMF can be liquidated in an orderly fashion and the type of arbitrage
that occurred in the case of the Reserve Primary Fund can be minimized.
The revisions to 2a-7 aim to reduce a MMF's credit and interest rate
risk by improving the quality, liquidity, and diversification of assets held by
MMFs. These changes make it less likely that a MMF's actual NAV will
fall below its $1 amortized cost value.47 Better assets are indeed likely to
reduce the volatility of MMF NAVs, but it should be noted that the
volatility cannot be reduced entirely: there is always the possibility that a
seemingly-quality issuer of securities may turn bad very quickly (as LBHI
did) - even with concentration limits, a group of similarly positioned issuers
could all suffer the same fate very quickly, affecting a MMF's NAV. This
is not a reason to tighten the standards of 2a-7 any further - increased
restrictions on asset quality may further restrict the markets for commercial
paper and municipal bonds, and further depress yields, which are already
very low,48 thus driving funds out of the market. It is, however, a reason to
be mindful that, notwithstanding the changes to 2a-7, a MMF could still
break the buck, and the potential consequences of such an eventuality (such
as industry-wide and systemic runs) should be considered.
The changes to Rule 2a-7 also do not address this possibility of
system-wide failure. As the financial crisis of 2008 has shown, when all
players in a market are forced to sell their assets at the same time, the price
of those assets is driven down even if those assets are of high quality and
highly liquid.49 This could occur, for example, if MMFs across the industry
were facing increased redemptions and thus forced to sell fund assets at firesale prices: this would increase the volatility of the NAVs of shares in
MMFs. If a market contraction were severe enough, there might not be any
buyers at all, rendering the assets illiquid. A fear of exactly this type of
system-wide failure was the impetus for intervention by the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury Department in 2008-2009.
b. Temporary Regulatory Responses During the Financial Crisis
After the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck and following the
ensuing general run on MMFs in September 2008, the Federal Reserve and
the Treasury Department took some extraordinary steps. The Federal
47. MONEY MARKET FuND REFORM, INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT RELEASE No.
29132 (Feb. 23, 2010). It is worth noting that the reduction in the amount of second tier
securities in which a MMF can invest has significantly reduced the market for lower-rated,
longer-term commercial paper, and thus reduced funding options for the issuers of that paper.
48.

MMFs Likely to Hold Elevated Level of Importance Says Moody's Report,

Mar. 26, 2010, http://www.cranedata.com/archives/all-articles/2781/ (stating,
with respect to the changes to Rule 2a-7, "[w]e believe that the rules are manageable, but
incrementally, there will be higher costs to managing MMFs and yields will be constrained
by the risk and liquidity limits").
49. GORTON, supra note 6.
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Reserve, acting under its emergency power in Section 13(3) of the Federal
Reserve Act to make loans in "unusual and exigent circumstances," put in
place several programs intended to restore confidence in the MMF industry.
A week after the Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck, the Federal Reserve
created the Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund
Liquidity Facility," under which the Federal Reserve made loans to banks
to be used for purchasing high quality commercial paper from MMFs. A
month later, in October 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Money
Market Investor Funding Facility,51 under which the Federal Reserve made
loans to special purpose vehicles to facilitate the purchase of treasuries and
highly rated commercial paper from MMFs. The intention of both of these
programs was to create markets for securities held by MMFs, thus
improving liquidity for MMFs and assisting them in meeting redemption
requests. Indirectly, these programs were intended to improve conditions in
the short term credit markets in which MMFs play a key role.12 That the
Federal Reserve felt compelled to take such extraordinary steps to ensure
that MMFs continued to function throughout the financial crisis is
illustrative of their importance as a market for short-term credit.
The Treasury Department created a temporary guaranty program for
MMFs, which covered all investments in MMFs made on or before
September 19, 2008. There was no cap on the amount of shares that could
be guaranteed, and most MMFs elected to participate in the program53 so as
to be able to market themselves as "safe." Funding for the guaranty program
came from a participation fee of 1-1.5 basis points per share, paid by
participants in the program, and the Exchange Stabilization Fund was
available in the event a MMF was liquidated and Treasury needed to pay
out. 54 The program expired in September, 2009, without Treasury having to

50. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Asset-Backed
Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (Feb. 5, 2010) (on file
with author), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/abcpmmmf.htm.
This program expired on Feb. 1, 2010.
51. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Money Market
Investor Funding Facility (Feb. 5, 2010) (on file with author), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/mmiff.htm. This program expired on Oct.
30, 2009. Id.
52. Id.; see also Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. (Oct. 21,
2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
press/monetary/20081021 a.htm).
53. Jack Murphy et al., Recent Developments Affecting Money Market Funds, 126
BANKING L.J. 394, 395 (2009).

54. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces Guarantee Program
for Money Market Funds (Sept. 29, 2008) (on file with author), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp 1161.htm.
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make any payments. 5 This last program can be seen as a test case for a
more permanent insurance facility for the MMF industry, which will be
considered in more detail later in this article.
2. PotentialFurtherReforms
The threshold question with regard to potential further reforms for
MMFs is whether any are necessary at all. The recent changes to Rule 2a-7
are intended to reduce the riskiness and volatility of MMF asset holdings,
and thus, the chances that a MMF will break the buck. By strengthening
individual MMFs, these changes go towards mitigating systemic risk issues;
however, as discussed above, there is still potential for a MMF to break the
buck, or for a system-wide liquidity crunch to prevent a MMF from
honoring all redemption requests. To the extent that a MMF breaks the
buck or is unable to satisfy redemption requests and there is ensuing panic
that causes an industry-wide run on MMFs, this may cause an unloading of
collateral which will be deleterious of the value of that collateral, affecting
the market as a whole.56 An industry-wide run on MMFs may also
precipitate a systemic run because MMFs are a primary funding source for
issuers of highly-rated municipal bonds and commercial paper, as well as
for the counterparties that rely on repurchase agreements for short-term
funding. The thesis of this article is that because experience has shown that
a panic regarding a single MMF can spark industry-wide and systemic runs,
a precautionary regulatory approach is appropriate,57 and further reform
addressing these eventualities should be considered.
The remainder of this article therefore discusses potential further
reforms, remaining mindful, however, of the fact that regulatory reform of
MMFs that is too costly or stringent might cause fund families to cease
offering these products. Already, the changes to Rule 2a-7 have increased
the regulatory burden on operators of MMFs, and the yield on Treasuries is
almost zero at present. As SEC Commissioner Aguilar noted in a recent
speech, "Persistent low yields and the out-flows of assets has resulted in
various managers either quitting the business, or reducing the number of
money market funds through mergers, liquidations or sales."58 The trend
seems to be for the industry to consolidate, but the Moody's Industry
55. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Treasury Announces Expiration of
Guarantee Program for Money Market Funds (Sept. 18, 2009) (on file with author), available
at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg293.htm.
56.
57.

BRUNNERmEIER, supra note 31.
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 235 (2008). The author

makes some interesting comparisons between cost/benefit analyses associated with financial
regulation and cost/benefit analyses associated with other types of regulation, such as
environmental and health regulation, where the regulator does not have decisive evidence of
the regulated activity's harm.
58.

Aguilar, supra note 28.
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Outlook report for the Asset Management Industry59 notes that "the costs of
managing these funds will continue to be challenging, even for scale
players." As discussed above, MMFs play an important role in the financial
system, so the costs of any economic reform should not be such as to drive
them completely out of the market: their absence from the market is likely
to result in investors moving their investments to riskier, less regulated
investment vehicles. 60
a. Floating the Net Asset Value
There has been a concern that the stable $1 NAV offered by MIFs
creates a misleading impression that investments in MMFs are as stable as
putting money in a guaranteed deposit account (i.e. if you put a dollar in, it
is guaranteed that you can take a dollar out). To avoid this perception, the
SEC, and others, are considering requiring that MMFs stop using the
amortized cost method of valuation and move to a floating rate, marked-tomarket NAy. 6 1 The theory behind this argument is that if the NAV floats it
will be clear that an investment in a MMF is a fluctuating investment, and a
change in the market NAV of a share in a MMF will not provide arbitrage
opportunities or precipitate a fund-specific run. Also, breaking the buck
will not have the stigma necessary to cause a panic sufficient to provoke an
industry-wide run. Not everyone is convinced by this logic: the Investment
Company Institute argues that floating the NAV will not reduce panic
sufficient to stop industry-wide runs on MMFs. It uses as an example the
floating rate ultra-short bond mutual fund market, which was damaged
(losing half of its assets in the course of 2008) notwithstanding that the
bonds were floating rate. The ICI also cites French floating-value MMFs,
which lost about 40 percent of their assets in a three-month time span from
July 2007 to September 2007.62
The ICI's argument, however, does not address the arbitrage
opportunities offered by a fixed NAV and how investors availing
themselves of these opportunities could precipitate a fund-specific run
(which could cause sufficient panic to contagion an industry-wide run). The
argument also neglects the fact that, while a MMF fund breaking the buck is
not the only trigger that could cause a run on MMFs, the panic after the
Reserve Primary Fund broke the buck did indeed precipitate an industrywide run on MMFs. The question becomes, then, whether having MMFs

59.

MMFs Likely to Hold ElevatedLevel of Importance Says Moody's Report, supra

note 48.
60.
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THE U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY SYSTEM 24 (2009), available at http://business.cch.com/
securitiesLaw/news/06-18-09a.pdf; GORTON & METRICK, supra note 37, at 13.
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with a stable $1 NAV is of such utility to the economy that the use of the
amortized cost method of valuation should continue to be permitted,
notwithstanding that this type of valuation is subject to abuse by
sophisticated investors through arbitrage, and could give an impression of
stability that is unwarranted.
Some of the benefits and costs of moving to a floating rate NAV were
pithily summarized in the New York Times as follows:
[A] floating net asset value would underscore the prospect of losses, highlight
fluctuations in value and provide more transparency. A floating value would also
have tax implications and create more paperwork for investors who would have
gains or losses that do not occur with a stable net asset value of $1.63
The adverse effects of floating the NAV go beyond this, however: it is
widely acknowledged that the ability to put a dollar into a money market
fund and get a dollar out is one of the most important attractions to
investors.64
Lyon has argued that, notwithstanding the arbitrage
opportunities associated with floating the NAV, "[i]t may still be rational
for some investors to accept minimal dilution in return for possible
accounting cost savings and the short-term stability amortized cost offers."65
There is a real need in our financial system for a cash management
product that offers a stable value investment in low-risk securities, which
can be withdrawn at short notice to accommodate funding needs as they
arise.66 If MMFs do not have a stable NAV, investors are likely to move
their funds to different products: to quote one institutional investor, "[i]f a
money market fund is not dollar-in, dollar-out, you won't have my dollar. 67
Because of the important role MMFs play in the economy, proposals to float
the NAV, which have the potential to kill the industry, should not be
pursued.
b. An Insurance Scheme for Money Market Funds
One of the proposals under consideration is an insurance scheme for
MMFs, intended to stop or at least mitigate single-fund runs on MMFs.
Runs are understood to be caused by investors making "prisoner's
dilemma"-type calculations: 61 in a time of market crisis, the value of an
investment in a MMF will be best protected if all the investors in that MMF
63. Tara Siegel Bernard, Rewriting Rules to ProtectMoney Funds, N.Y. TIMEs, June
24, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/O6/25/your-money/mutual-

funds-and-etfs/25ffund.html.
64. Aguilar, supra note 28.
65. See Lyon, supranote 17, at 1020.
66.

BRUNNERMEJER,

67.

Stevens, supra note 35.

supra note 31.

68. Patricia A. McCoy, The Moral Hazard Implications of Deposit Insurance:
Theory and Evidence, CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FNANcJAL AND MONETARY LAW 417, 421

(2008), available at

Journalof Business & Securities Law

[Vol. I11

refrain from redeeming their investments (this prevents an MMF from
having to liquidate its holdings and sell its assets into a distressed market in
order to satisfy an increased volume of redemption requests). However, an
investor cannot rely on other investors in the MMF not to redeem in the
event of a panic, and if other investors redeem, the first investor will be in a
worse position because the MMF will satisfy the early redemptions at $1
per share and potentially use up its best and most liquid collateral in doing
so. Thus, the first investor is incentivized to redeem his or her investment
as early as possible because there may be insufficient liquid assets
remaining in a MMF (or the value of a MMF's assets may have fallen
because of system-wide fire sales of collateral) to satisfy later redemptions
for $1 per share. While the changes to Rule 22e-3 do go toward reassuring
investors that they will all be treated equally in the event of a fund
liquidation, an investor may still benefit from a discrepancy between the
market price of a share and its $1 NAV by redeeming before the board
suspends redemptions (there will indeed be a perverse incentive to try to
withdraw before the board makes such a determination, given that the share
price after the fund is liquidated is likely to be less than $1). Only an
insurance scheme can provide an investor with comfort that he or she will
receive $1 per share, no matter when that investor seeks to redeem.
The obvious precedent for an insurance scheme for MMFs is the FDIC
protection currently provided to holders of bank deposit accounts. There
have been no systemic bank runs in the United States since federal deposit
insurance was instituted in 1933 (and runs were endemic before such
time),69 and this suggests that the existence of the insurance scheme has
been successful in stopping runs on banks (although this cannot be proven
empirically, the circumstantial evidence is convincing). It cannot be stated
with certainty that an insurance scheme for MMFs will be similarly
successful in preventing runs on MMFs, but as both deposit accounts and
MMFs are withdrawal-at-will products that are susceptible to runs
occasioned by loss of confidence and "prisoner's dilemma"-type
calculations by investors, it is likely that a comparable insurance scheme
will also limit runs on MMFs. As discussed above, many economists were
resistant to implementing the FDIC deposit insurance scheme in the 1930s
because of the moral hazard it created." Similar moral hazard arguments
can be made against an insurance scheme for MMFs, but the creation of a
manageable level of moral hazard should not be used as a justification to
veto an insurance scheme that is likely to be effective in maintaining
investor confidence and promoting systemic stability. In any event, there is
already a degree of moral hazard that applies to the MMF industry - by
instituting its temporary guaranty in 2008, the U.S. Government has already
69.
70.

GORTON, supra note 6.
GORTON & METRICK, supra note 37, at 13.
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indicated its view that the industry is too important to fail, 71 which to some
degree disincentivizes regulatory and investor supervision. 72 There is
currently uncertainty as to whether and how the U.S. Government will act to
protect MMFs in the future 73 and that uncertainty comes at a cost to
systemic stability. Reacting to a crisis in market confidence after a panic
has started may not be enough: "Ad hoc approaches do not always work.
Sometimes they may be too late and the harm has been done or no longer
can be prevented. 74 The ideal would be to put in place an insurance
scheme for MMFs that provides certainty in times of panic but is structured
in such a way as to mitigate the moral hazard created by that certainty.
In the context of deposit insurance schemes, reference is usually made
to two types of moral hazard: firstly, that (absent structural constraint)
banks are encouraged by the presence of an insurance/guaranty scheme to
take bigger risks, knowing that they will reap the profits of riskier
investments but not be required to internalize the consequences of any
drastic failures, which instead will be borne by the deposit insurance
scheme. It is more difficult to make this moral hazard argument in the
context of an insurance fund for MMFs, given that Rule 2a-7 already
significantly curtails the risks fund managers can take with MMF
investments." The requirements for prudent investing set forth in Rule 2a-7
mute many of the moral hazard arguments against instituting an insurance
scheme for MMFs, but notwithstanding the stringency of Rule 2a-7, there is
always the risk that the existence of an insurance scheme might lead the
SEC to become lax in supervising compliance with Rule 2a-7 standards, or
even relax Rule 2a-7 itself, given that the consequences of MMF failure are
less severe in the face of an insurance scheme.76 For these reasons, it would

71. GORTON & METRICK, supra note 37, at 7. The authors note that after
implementing the temporary guaranty of MMFs in 2008, "it may not be credible for the
government to commit to any other strategy in the future." They also note that this implicit
guaranty gives MMFs for free the type of government backing which insured deposit-taking
institutions have to pay for.
72. See McCoy, supra note 68.
73. See generally Schwarcz, supra note 57 ("Uncertainty about government
responses does have a benefit in that it goes some way towards mitigating the moral hazard
created by the implicit government guaranty of MMFs: the more certain a bailout, the more
reliance on that bailout is incentivized.").
74. Id.at 231.
75. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (2010). While there are concentration limits that apply to loans
by commercial banks, these are nowhere near as restrictive as the restrictions on investments
set forth in Rule 2a-7. See supra pp. 4, 8-9 (explaining that banking regulators monitor the
safety and soundness of the bank as a whole, rather than setting out strict limitations on the
types of loans that banks can make).
76. See generally Gillian G. H. Garcia, Deposit Insurance: A Survey of Actual &
Best Practices 7 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 99/54, 1999), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/1999/wp9954.pdf (discussing the effect of moral
hazard on regulatory supervisors).
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make sense to require the SEC to consider the systemic risks posed by
MMF failure before relaxing any rule-making regarding MMF investments.
The second type of moral hazard issue that is usually considered with
respect to deposit insurance schemes is the concern that depositors will rely
on such insurance schemes instead of proactively monitoring the prudence
of their bank's activities (and thus will not exert market pressure on the
bank to manage investment risks appropriately)." This concern also plays
out a little differently in the context of MMFs. Because the investment
criteria set forth in Rule 2a-7 are so strict, there is actually very little risk
that a MIF will fail except during a severe market disruption that adversely
affects a substantial amount of high quality investments.
Investor
supervision of MMFs would therefore only be helpful if investors could
accurately assess the risk to MMF investments in such circumstances.
However, investors tend to find it difficult to estimate the risk associated
with such rare and unpredictable tail events78 and therefore may not be able
to accurately monitor a MMF for such risk. Additionally, larger investors
have little incentive to act to preserve the interests of other investors or the
stability of the system,79 unless their interests are perfectly aligned with
those other investors and systemic stability. 0 In the context of MMFs, the
interests of sophisticated, information-rich investors are often best served by
exploiting the arbitrage opportunities inherent in the fixed $1 NAV, often to
the detriment of smaller investors and systemic stability. Increased
oversight by large investors may thus be worse for systemic stability,
whereas incentives to arbitrage are reduced by the presence of an insurance
scheme for MMFs: even if a share in a MMF is overvalued at $1 in terms of
the assets backing that share, it will not be overvalued in terms of worth to
the investor because there is a government guaranty in place that any
investor redeeming a share in a MMF will get $1 for such share.
When considering the moral hazards created by an MMF insurance
scheme, it is also worth considering whether the creation of a governmentbacked insurance scheme provides an implicit government endorsement of
reliance on MMFs to satisfy short-term funding needs.1 Over-reliance on
77. McCoy, supra note 68, at 422.
78. Schwarcz, supra note 57, at 233.
79. Id. at 248 ("[L]ike a tragedy of the commons, market participants have
insufficient incentives, absent regulation, to limit risk-taking in order to reduce the systemic
danger to others.").
80. See McCoy, supra note 68. In the context of bank deposits, it is generally
accepted that the interests of large and small depositors are aligned, and that the benefits of
increased supervision and market pressure from large depositors accrue to the smaller
depositors (who, because of collective action problems, cannot themselves exert the requisite
market pressure on banks).
81. This issue here is whether investors will fail, because of the existence of a MMF
insurance scheme, to adequately consider the risks associated with using MvIFs in general
(to be distinguished from the concern that investors will not adequately consider the risks
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short-term funding can be problematic: in a recently released White Paper,
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York considered the reliance the market
places on the tri-party repurchase market (in which, as discussed above,
MMFs are a major purchaser of securities and thus a provider of short-term
funding)8 . In the White Paper, the New York Fed noted that the reliance by
the market generally, and by broker-dealers in particular, on intraday credit
is a significant concern and has "left the market vulnerable to severe
disruption."83 The problems with market reliance on short-term funding go
far beyond broker/dealer reliance on MMFs as a funding source, however,
and there is a much broader debate afoot about how market participants
should structure their funding sources so as to minimize their vulnerability
to exogenous shocks. It is the author's view that any moral hazard caused
by an implicit government endorsement of the short-term funding provided
by MMs is best addressed not by abandoning the concept of an insurance
scheme for MMFs, as suppliers of short-term funding but as part of the
larger debate about regulating broker-dealers and other market participants
who are on the demand side of the funding equation.84
This analysis of moral hazard concerns suggests that they are not so
overwhelming as to discourage the implementation of an insurance scheme
for MMFs. The question then becomes, what form should such an
insurance scheme take? The ICI is exploring setting up a private liquidity
facility, which would be a bank created by the industry85 to assist MMFs
that are unable to liquidate their assets to meet redemptions. It will be
interesting to see what proposal the ICI makes in this respect, but an
industry-backed scheme, lacking the imprimatur of government regulation,
may not give investors sufficient comfort to forgo redemptions in the event
of a panic. Also, a liquidity facility is not the same as providing a direct
guaranty to each investor that he or she will receive a dollar out for every
dollar put in - the ICI's proposed scheme would instead provide funding to
a MMF that is having difficulty meeting redemption requests, to assist that
MMIF in fully satisfying those requests. The distinction between a liquidity
facility and a guaranty is nuanced but one that is likely to be important to
investors in the event of a financial panic.
This article thus advocates exploration of an insurance scheme that is
backed by the government and regulated by a government agency, which
would pay $1 per share to each investor in a MMF in the event that such
associated with, and thus not adequately monitor, a particular MMF). This issue is rarely
discussed in the context of commercial banks, because governments want to encourage
deposits with banks (rather than under mattresses) to ensure that money is used productively
and can move around the system as a steady supply of credit.
82.

83.
84.
interesting
85.
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Id. at6.
Questions about the appropriate form and content of such regulation raise
and complex issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
Stevens, supra note 35.
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MMF became insolvent. Treasury's temporary guaranty of MMFs during
the financial crisis of 2008 provides a partial template for such a program,
but the scheme would need to be updated in several ways. Most obviously,
the Treasury guaranty only applied to investments made before September
19, 2008, which would not be appropriate in an ongoing program. Also, the
Treasury relied on the Exchange Stabilization Fund to backstop the
guaranty, which is not feasible as a long-term measure.86 The IMF's
literature on deposit insurance schemes indicates that best practices for such
schemes include de facto or de jure compulsory participation87 and funding
through payments of premia by industry participants.88 In line with these
best practices, MMFs should pay premia for the protection provided to their
investors by the insurance scheme. What is open to more debate, however,
is whether premia should be paid in advance or only after a crisis.89 To
some extent, an ex post funding mechanism alleviates moral hazard
concerns because industry participants are not making investment decisions
with the knowledge that there is a pot of money waiting to be spent in the
event of a crisis (as is the case with ex ante funding schemes). For an ex
post funding mechanism to work in the context of a MMF insurance
scheme, however, there would need to be incentives for a MMF not to
simply exit the market if and when payments become due: if an ex post
funding mechanism were implemented, it would be worth exploring some
form of licensing requirement for MMFs which would be forfeited if a
MMF failed to pay insurance scheme premia that fell due after a crisis,
which license would be considered to have an intrinsic value similar to that
of a bank charter and thus not be something to abandon lightly.90
The alternative to an ex post funded scheme is an ex ante funding
mechanism, which does pose some moral hazard issues but is nonetheless
used by the bulk of countries with deposit insurance schemes. 91 The
86.

See DAVID WESSEL, IN FED WE TRuST: BEN BERNANKE'S WAR ON THE GREAT

PANIC 208-09 (2009). Congress has acted to forbid Treasury from using the Exchange
Stabilization Fund in this way again. This Congressional act also might make it difficult for
the existing implicit government guaranty of MMFs to be satisfied in the event of another
financial crisis involving a run on MMFs.
87. Garcia, supra note 76, at 17. Participation does not necessarily need to be
required by law - often market forces will compel broad participation in a voluntary
insurance scheme, as occurred with the Treasury's temporary guaranty program in 2008. In
the absence of organic broad participation, however, legislation requiring participation in the
insurance scheme may be required.
88. Id. at 11. Industry funding reduces moral hazard (and is also more politically
palatable than taxpayer funding). Nonetheless, the nature of a government guaranty means
that, in the event that industry-funded premia cannot satisfy all guaranteed redemption
requests, the government would have to provide back-up funding.
89. Garcia, supra note 76, at 19-20.
90.

GORTON & METRICK, supra note 37, at 13.

91. Garcia, supra note 76, at 19. Ex ante funding is also more politically palatable as
it reduces the risk that taxpayers will be called upon to pay for the guaranty.
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Treasury guaranty program required, and the FDIC insurance scheme
continues to require, the ex ante payment of participation fees.92 However,
the FDIC scheme does not provide a perfect model for participation fees for
a MMF insurance facility, for the FDIC guaranty is capped (currently at
$250,000 per deposit account) and participation fees are calculated
accordingly. As discussed above, the volumes that institutional investors
have invested in MMFs are far in excess of $250,000, and ideally (as with
the Treasury guaranty) a MMF insurance scheme would cover an unlimited
number of shares in a MMF.93 To date, no economic analysis that I am
aware of has been done on the levels of premia that would be necessary to
provide such an unlimited guaranty or even a limited guaranty.94 It may be
that caps of some kind, and/or some form of additional government funding
for the insurance scheme, are necessary to keep premia from making the
operation of MVs too costly, eliminating returns to investors as well as
incentives for fund managers to operate MMFs. However, as long as
MMFs are not driven out of the market, the increased cost of such premia is
justified because of the potential systemic cost of fund-specific an industrywide runs on MMFs.
To the extent the proposed insurance scheme does create new
incentives for riskier behavior, a risk-based premium structure might be
useful in mitigating such incentives. Studies by the IMF on deposit
insurance schemes suggest that even a small risk adjustment of premia can
encourage banks to take more appropriate risks.95 While quantifying risk
poses a big challenge for calculating risk-based premia for deposit insurance
schemes,96 the level of discrepancy between the actual value of a share in a
MMF and its $1 NAV is easy to determine and is a good indicator of the
risk that a MMF will break the buck (thus incentivizing arbitrage and runs).
We can look to the Treasury guaranty program discussed above as an
example of how risk-based premia might be implemented for MMFs: under
that program there were two tiers of fees. 7 MMFs with an actual NAV
greater than or equal to $0.9975 per share98 had to pay an upfront fee of 1
basis point per share, and MMFs with a NAV greater than $0.995 but less

92.

12 U.S.C. § 1815(d) (2010).

93. See supra p. 18. As discussed above, unlike in the context of large bank
depositors, there is little to be gained by capping coverage limits to encourage large investors
to monitor MMF investments more closely.
94. When completed, the ICI's investigation into the feasibility of an industry-based
liquidity backstop for MMFs may be illuminating on this point. The President's Working
Group on Financial Markets is also due to deliver a report on MMFs, which may touch on
this point.
95. McCoy, supra note 68, at 429.
96. Id. at 429.
97. See supra p. 11.
98. As of the close of business on September 19, 2008.
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than $0.9975 had to pay an upfront fee of 1.5 basis points per share.99 A
permanent tiered program like this (with the NAV measured at set intervals
on an ongoing basis).. would create incentives for MMFs to monitor their
investment profiles closely and keep their actual NAVs closer to $1.
Finally, a regulator would need to be selected to administer any MMF
insurance scheme. MMFs are currently regulated by the SEC, but the SEC
has traditionally limited itself to a disclosure and investor protection
mandate, and the prudential supervision which would be required to
administer an ongoing insurance program has not been part of its purview."'
Further, the SEC does not have expertise in managing systemic risk,"0 2
which responsibility has generally fallen to the Federal Reserve. The
banking regulators are more experienced with administering deposit
insurance programs, but they do not have the SEC's familiarity with the
MMF industry and its valuation procedures. Whichever entity administers
the scheme would need to have the power to carry out the orderly
liquidation of MMFs that are unable to meet redemption requests, similar to
the power conferred on the FDIC by 12 USC s182 1(c).
c. Other Proposed Long Term Reforms
There are many other proposals for MMF reform that are currently
being debated. These include requiring that large redemption requests be
satisfied with securities instead of cash; real-time disclosure of the shadow
price of a share; posting of MMF holdings on websites; and a possible twotiered system of MMFs, with only "safer" MlFs being able to use the
amortized cost method to maintain a stable NAV. 3 On the latter proposal,
the SEC has received many comments that such a structure would not be
practicable: essentially, the complaints are that drawing a line
differentiating tiers of MMFs would be very difficult and such a line would

99. MMFs with an NAV less than $0.995 on September 19, 2008 were excluded
from the program.
100. This indicator is subject to some limitations, however. It provides a snapshot of
risk at the time of reporting, and as such an MMF could manipulate its risk rating by
improving portfolio quality immediately prior to reporting dates, and reducing it immediately
afterwards.
101. See generally H. DAVID KOTZ, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM'N, SEC's OVERSIGHT OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED
SUPERVISED
ENTITY
PROGRAM:
REPORT
No.
446-A
(2008),
available at

http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/2008/446-a.pdf The SEC's limited experience as a
prudential regulator for Lehman Brothers, Bear Steams, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch and
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be ripe for abuse. 10 4 In any event, such a proposal would only reduce the
likelihood of, but not prevent, a top-tier MMF breaking the buck and the
potential for an ensuing industry-wide run. The bottom-tier MMFs that
were dubbed "less safe" and required to float their NAVs would likely go
out of business. Similarly, the proposal for mandatory redemptions-inkind" 5 would also deviate from the appeal of MMFs as a "dollar in, dollar
out" investment and cause investors to remove their funds from the MMF
industry to a different product. Finally, the proposals requiring increased
disclosure regarding shadow prices and MMF portfolio holdings, while
intended to increase transparency for investors, have the potential to
increase arbitrage activity: sophisticated institutional investors will be better
able than retail investors to utilize this data to determine when the $1 NAV
is more or less than the market value of the share. With the exception of the
proposal for mandatory redemptions in kind (which would fundamentally
alter the structure of MMFs such that they would lose their appeal to
investors), none of these proposals address the potential for an industrywide run on MMFs, with the attendant dumping of collateral into the market
and the potential for systemic runs on the commercial paper and repo
markets.
III. CONCLUSION
MMFs play a key role in the financial system: they serve as both an
important and convenient cash management tool for retail and institutional
investors and as a primary market for issuers of commercial paper and
municipal bonds and sellers in the tri-party repo market. Without a stable
$1 NAV, the investment has little appeal to retail and institutional investors,
and any proposal to float the NAV should not be pursued because it would
likely kill the market for this important product, with the result that the
funds currently invested in MMFs will flow to other (potentially
unregulated) products. However, further reform of the MMF industry is
warranted, given that the experience with the Reserve Primary Fund has
shown that one MMF breaking the buck can lead to industry-wide runs,
which can precipitate runs in other areas of the financial system, as well as
large-scale dumping of collateral that drives down asset prices throughout

104. See MONEY MARKET FUND REFORM, INVESTMENT CoMPANY ACT RELEASE No.
29132 (Feb. 23, 2010). These issues were all raised by commentators on the proposed

changes to Rule 2a-7.
105. This proposal is intended to address situations of market-wide illiquidity,
allowing MMFs that cannot liquidate their portfolios to meet redemption requests to satisfy
those redemption requests with securities. By extension, this proposal would also reduce the
amount of securities MMFs sell into the markets, which sales have the potential to drive
down asset prices system-wide when the MVIF industry as a whole is facing increased
redemption requests.
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the financial system. To this end, there should be exploration of the
feasibility of an insurance scheme for holders of shares in MMFs.

